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Introduction  
• Using a power transition perspective, this 
paper analyzes the regional and global 
implications of different enlargement 
formulation of the European Union (EU) 
during the first half of the 21st century.  
– First, it assesses the consequences of 
expanded EU membership with varying 
enlargement scenarios on global power 
distributions and considers the EU’s position in 
the new world order.  
– Next, the paper examines EU’s external 
economic and security relations and considers 
how they might be affected by future 
enlargement of the Union. 
Theory and the Analytic 
Model 
• The model we utilize in this study is based on 
research that started with A.F.K. Organski’s (1958) 
seminal work in world politics and later developed by 
Kugler and Organski (1980) and Tammen et al (2000).  
• The most basic proposition is that war is most likely 
to occur when the relative power of two competing 
nations approaches parity.  
• A second fundamental proposition is that nations do 
not interact in anarchy.  
– The dominant nation establishes the status quo and 
persuades some to join and be satisfied with the existing 
order.  
– When parity approaches, a dissatisfied challenger is likely to 
challenge and may wage war against the dominant nation.  
– Under similar conditions, a satisfied challenger may seek 
integration. 
Theory and model 
• In addition to power and status quo dynamics, 
power transition theory includes the concept 
of hierarchal relationships among global 
powers.  
• We focus on ordering within hierarchies to 
determine the role of hierarchies in 
cooperation and conflict.  
– An unordered hierarchy emerges when most 
nations hold roughly equal shares of power.  
– Ordered hierarchies are characterized by power 
concentrated in the hands of a dominant global or 
regional power who establishes and supports the 
status quo.  
The model 
•  Where; 
– CI = Conflict - Integration 
– RP = Relative Power 
– S = Status Quo  
– Hc = Hierarchy of Challenger 
– Hd = Hierarchy of Defender 
  Dc HHRPSRPCI  3
The model 
• The dependent variable is a measure 
of the deepening of integration at 
the one end of the spectrum and 
worsening conflict at the other end: 
High        High 
Severity of Conflict    neutral   Level of Integration 
Integration Achievement Score 
(IAS) 
• First developed by Hufbauer 
and Schott (1994) and 
further advanced by Efird 
and Genna (2002) 
• six categories that measure 
the level of regional 
integration.  
– Free movement of goods and 
services 
– Free movement of capital 
– Free movement of labor 
– Supranational institutions 
– Monetary coordination 
– Fiscal coordination 
• Each category has a value of 0 
(low) through 5 (high) along a 
Guttman scale: 
Measure of conflict 
• The second part of this scale 
measures the level of conflict 
among nations.  
• Estimates are taken from the 
Hostility Level data developed by 
the COW project.  These data are 
transformed to reflect intensity 
following Goldstein (1992) who 
surveyed a panel of foreign policy 
experts—averaging their weighting 
of events—so that WEIS events 
ranging from conflict to extreme 
conflict can be classified. Efird 
(2000) reports the resulting 
conversion of COW Hostility 
Scores to Goldstein-WEIS scaling 
scores are as follows:  
Hostility 
Level 
Coding 
Description of 
Coding 
Goldstein-
WEIS 
Interval 
Adjusted 
Conflict-
Integration 
Interval 
0 No event 0 4.00 
1 No militarized action -2.4 4.96 
2 Threat to use force -5.8 6.32 
3 Display of force -7.6 7.04 
4 Use of Force -8.3 7.32 
5 War -10.0 8.00 
Independent Variables 
• Relative Power 
– Measure of relative power is GDP that includes the number of 
people who can work and fight, their economic productivity.  
– Population is a solid base but alone does not translate into power.  
This is apparent in the relative weakness of India, Indonesia, or 
Brazil - the population also must be productive for a country to be 
powerful.  
– For this reason developed countries have far more influence in 
international relations than their developing counterparts.  
• Satisfaction 
– Status quo represented as S, is the joint satisfaction of the 
challenger and defender with their dyadic relationship. It reflects 
the set of similar policies and preferences for each dyad. We rely 
on Tucker’s (1999) computations of the S-statistic for all alliances 
since 1816, and EUGene is used to aggregate the data into dyadic 
format (Bennett and Stam 2000a).  
• Hierarchy  
 
Measuring Hierarchies 
• The view of hierarchies 
utilized here rests on Efird 
(2000) and Efird et al (2004) 
Each region is dominated by 
varying degrees, by a 
regionally-powerful country. In 
turn, all nations then compete 
at the global level. In this 
formulation, even the great 
powers are constrained by 
their particular regional 
concerns. If their 
“neighborhood” is not in order 
or consistent with their 
preferences, then they are 
unlikely to look further abroad 
for a conflict. 
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ANALYSIS 
• Global power transition, 
• EU as a global actor, 
• Current enlargement of the EU, 
• Future enlargement of the EU, 
• Expected and unexpected 
consequences of future EU 
enlargement(s)! 
Future European Union 
• EU25 
• EU29 
– Add Bulgaria and Romania (2007) 
– Add Croatia (2008-2010) 
– Add Turkey (2014-2020) 
Forecasting GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita 
for EU25, EU29 and Global Competitors: 
2000-2050 (size of the bubble represents per capita 
productivity measured in PPP) 
Power Transition 2000-2050
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Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: 
EU25-Turkey, 2000-2050 
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Neutrality 
EU Enlargement & Turkey 
• The simulation results indicate no conflict is likely to occur 
between Turkey and the current EU25, rather the 
possibility of further integration extends for the near 
future.  This is consistent with reality.  
• Turkey and the EU already have a customs union agreement 
with increasing bilateral trade and investment between 
their economies.  Therefore, it is highly probably that 
integration will continue to deepen.   
• Turkey’s also substantiates the expected positive 
contribution to EU’s future growth within the global 
hierarchy.  
• That result substantiates the Commission’s findings on this 
subject in 2004.  
• Our analysis thus suggests a likely accession of Turkey into 
the EU despite current rumblings among some member 
states’ reservations about Turkey’s place in the Union.  
Implications of EU29 for 
the Middle East 
GDP Share and Per Capita GDP Between Iran, Israel, Russia, and Turkey: 2000-2050
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Figure 8:  Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: Iran-Russia, 2000-2050
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Figure 9: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: Russia-Turkey, 2000-2050
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Figure 7. Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: Iran-Turkey, 2000-2050
Figure 10: GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita Between EU29 and Iran: 2000 - 2050 
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Figure 11: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: EU29-Iran, 2000-2050 
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Conclusions 
• Findings in this paper reaffirm the earlier global results that 
China is expected to reach parity with the US in 2025-2030 and 
move ahead to be the largest economy in the world.   
• The US, will continue to have largest per capita productivity 
among the three giants and will retain its second rank status way 
into this century.   
• The economic future of the EU, is not quite as promising.  
– Regardless of its enlargement plans, the EU will fall behind the 
others giants becoming the third largest economy.   
– Part of the expected decline in its GDP share could be offset by 
adding Turkey.  
– Contrary to current public opinion in the EU, it is only after 
Turkey’s accession that EU’s economic decline levels off and starts 
to increase in its projected per capita productivity.  
Conclusions cont. 
• Turkey’s EU membership will have important implication for regional 
stability in the Middle East.    
• Russia’s dominance in northern Middle East is in decline while Iran and 
Turkey appear to be the regional challengers. 
• There exists parity between Iran and Turkey with the former slightly 
moving ahead in the next 40 years.   
• We also observe that dyatic relationship between Iran and Turkey is 
one of high probability of conflict that intensify very quickly with time.  
– competition for influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iraq.  
– they represent two polar opposite political systems of the region – Iran is a 
Shi’a theocracy while Turkey is a Western style secular (laicist) democracy.  
– Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  
– Future of Iraq. 
• Turkey’s membership in the EU would stabilize the volatile Middle East 
by removing Iran’s growing challenge in the region.   
• Turkey’s membership in the EU should be encouraged by leaders of the 
Transatlantic Alliance to stabilize this volatile region. 
